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1. Introduction
\The former employee who departs with condential business informa-
tion is the most exasperating of all competitors".1 Human resources are
assets over which rms cannot exercise ownership (Garmaise, 2011). The
value created by employees with technical know-how and key knowledge of
markets and costumers grew enormously. Yet, employees are leaving more
frequently their jobs to work for competitors or to start their own businesses.
Thus, from the employer's point of view, non-competition covenants (NCC)
in employment agreements often do make sense.
A NCC is a contract which preserves rms' private business information
from their former employees whose departure may lead to unfair competition.
It became increasingly popular to guard against the risk of losing condential
information to competitors after the termination of the employment. Con-
dential information means knowledge not publicly known in a given industry
which confers a competitive advantage over the rms which do not own it.2
A typical NCC states that after the termination of the employment for any
reason, the employee will not work in the same or similar business activities,
for herself or for anyone else, within a designated geographical area during
a given time period (Hutter, 1981). NCC are popular for long time (Blake,
1960; Starr et al., 2017) and, for instance in the US, are used not only in
the information technology (IT) industry but also in other industries such
as insurance, banking and law, and even in less-skilled knowledge industries
such as hairdressing (Krakel and Sliwka, 2009).3;4 There is also US data
suggesting that about half of the technical professionals are asked to sign a
NCC (Marx, 2011). The need of a NCC is however partly a function of the
probability of opportunistic behaviors in the employment relationship. The
greater the probability of particular types of opportunism, the greater is the
need of a NCC (Barney et al., 1994).
1Belmont Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 103 F.2d 538, 542 (3d Cir. 1939).
2For instance, trade secrets, goodwill embedded in customer lists and other intangible
assets.
3See New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-
clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-jobs.html.
4The rst known decision involving an employment covenant was in 1414, now known
as the Dyer's Case, where a master tried to extend the period of subservience of an
apprentice, restricting his rights to work as a craftsman. For a further discussion on the
history of the NCC see: Blake (1960) and Bryenton (1964).
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A NCC has value for the employers because, during the embargo period,
it protects sensible business information, but destroys value for the employees
because, over the embargo period, they are not allowed to work for the com-
petitors of their former employer, where their knowledge and expertise are
more appreciated and they could earn a higher salary. In the limit, employ-
ees may choose not to join a rm due to the restrictive nature of the NCC,
preventing the organization from gaining an initial competitive advantage.
Thus, a fair negotiation of a NCC should include a severance payment which
(at least) osets the opportunity cost of the manager related with the ter-
mination of the employment and the constrains of the covenant. It has been
also argued that the advantages of NCC to the public are the protection of
proprietary interests, facilitation of investments in R&D and encouragement
of human capital (personnel) development, whereas the disadvantages are the
potential of limiting competition, impeding the dissemination of information
and retarding the economic mobility of employees (Anenson, 2005).
For instance, Gilson (1999) and Hyde (2003) suggest that one of the main
reasons for the success of the high technology industrial district in Silicon Val-
ley and the failure of the one in Massachusetts' Route 128 was the dierential
enforcement of covenants not to compete. The dierent legal environments
led to higher employee turnover and, therefore, more rms in California (see
also Buente, 2012; Bishara and Orozco, 2012). Furthermore, Conti (2014)
investigates the eect of NCC on the type of R&D activity rms undertake,
using a dataset on the US patent applications, and concludes that these con-
tracts reduce the outbound mobility and knowledge leakages to competitors,
making the high-risk R&D projects relatively more valuable than the low-risk
ones and, therefore, inducing rms to choose riskier projects. Kobeissi et al.
(2010) study how state regulation of NCC agreements aect the payment
methods, premiums and abnormal returns on M&As.
Managers often breach NCC agreements arguing that they were illegal
and this behavior is considered admissible by courts. A typical litigation
concerns cases where one business hires the employee of the other in appar-
ent violation of a NCC (Anenson, 2005). A well-known case is that which
involved Kai-Fu Lee, a renowned well-connected computer scientist and for-
mer worker of Microsoft in China, who was later appointed president of
Google in China and, shortly after, Microsoft revealed that he was subject
to a NCC. Microsoft went to court in Seattle, Washington, which issued a
restraining order forbidding temporarily Kai-Fu Lee to work on projects for
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Google similar to those he performed for Microsoft.5;6 In the IT industry, the
fear of workers being poached is such that some large rms, including Google,
Apple, Yahoo and Genentech, have informally agreed not to hire managers
from rms they view as partners (Helfdt, 2009a,b).7
Courts tend to see NCC very unfavorably, particularly in the US and
the UK (Callahan, 1985). For instance, some US states, such as California,
Alabama and Alaska, forbid the use of these contracts, whereas Texas and
Michigan restrict signicantly their use (Den Hertog, 2003). Also, in the UK
in the 1980's, courts' decisions on NCC were so frequently unfavorable that
this contract was gradually replaced by the so-called garden leave (GL). A
GL has a similar restriction as the NCC regarding working for a competitor,
and can prevent the employee from working at all, but during the embargo
period the employee is paid full salary, including benets, by her (soon to
be) ex-employer.8 Recent evidence shows that the UK courts are still more
supportive of GL than of NCC (Klein and Pappas, 2009).
There is however an interesting case with PepsiCo where, despite the ab-
sence of a NCC agreement, the court imposed an injunction to one of its
former employees that prevented him from working for a competitor, advo-
cating that due to the nature of his work at PepsiCo it would be impossible
for him not to take advantage from condential information.
The empirical literature on NCC is yet limited and focuses mainly on the
US labor market and, in particular, on three occupations: physicians (Lavetti
et al., 2014), engineers (Marx, 2011; Marx et al., 2015) and CEOs (Garmaise,
2011; Bishara and Starr, 2016; Schwab and Thomas, 2006). For instance,
Marx (2011) suggests that about half of the technical professionals in the
US are asked to sign a NCC. Additionally, he concludes that ex-employees
that were tied to a NCC are more likely to take career detours and that
rms manage strategically the timing of the NCC agreement, waiting for
5In 2000, Kai-Fu Lee had signed an agreement providing that, for a period of one
year after leaving Microsoft, he would not \accept employment or engage in activities
competitive with products, services, or projects... on which [he] worked or about which
[he] learned condential or proprietary information or trade secrets while employed at
Microsoft."
6For further details see also: Bakerand Hosteller LLP Executive Alert, September 2005.
7For further information see: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/technology/companies/03trust.html?
and http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/technology/companies/04trust.html?
8The employee is to some extent on a \paid vacation".
4
the employee's bargaining power to weaken. Marx et al. (2015) conclude
that about 70.2 percent of rms use NCC with their top executives, and
their enforceability reduces signicantly the executive mobility. Schwab and
Thomas (2006) nd that about two-thirds of the CEO employment contracts
have a NCC, and that the correlation between the length of the embargo
period and the severance payment awarded to a departing CEO is weak.
More recently, Starr et al. (2017) show that in 2014 about 20 percent of the
labor force have employment contracts with a NCC, and almost 40 percent
of the labor force have signed at least once a NCC agreement, being these
agreements more popular in high-skill and high-paying jobs.
A manager can sign a NCC when hired, after being hired or when leaving
the rm. But if a NCC is to be signed, it should be studied very carefully in
order to be enforceable in case of litigation. We note that the \unnecessarily
long time span of the agreement" is the main reason why NCC are very often
considered illegal in the US. If there is litigation, courts inquire whether the
contract is socially and economically \reasonable" (Gaby Hardwicke Solic-
itors, 2011). Because there is not yet a well-established formal theoretical
framework to assess the rm-manager competing interests related to NCC.
Hence, courts do not have a formal theoretical guide to follow in order to
judge the legitimacy of NCC and determine the eect on rm's value of a
violation of this contract, which may lead to \ad-hoc" decisions, increases
litigation uncertainty and enhances both ineciencies in the labor market
and distortions in the employment relationships (Bit_e, 2011).
We develop a theoretical valuation model for a NCC. Although quite dis-
tinct in multiple aspects, this work intersects with those of the literature
on executive compensation, which examine the relationship between market
conditions and executive turnover, or the association between stock option
policy and managers retention, or the role of the severance payment in the
optimal corporate governance structure (e.g., Peters and Wagner, 2014; Al-
mazan and Suarez, 2003; Dahiya and Yermack, 2008; Edmans and Gabaix,
2009). It also relates to the labor law literature devoted to NCC and GL in
employment agreements (e.g., Callahan, 1985; Anenson, 2005; Bishara and
Orozco, 2012; Mack, 2015; Horvitz, 2016), and the labor economics literature,
for instance with research on the relation between the use of NCC and the
labor market mobility, or the association between the use of NCC and the
innovation pace (e.g., Den Hertog, 2003; Garmaise, 2011; Krakel and Sliwka,
2009; Marx, 2011; Conti, 2014; Tang et al., 2016).
Our paper contributes to the nance literature in several ways. Firstly, it
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presents the rst theoretical model that assesses the rm-manager competing
economic interests associated with the usage of NCC in employment agree-
ments considering uncertainty. Secondly, our model quanties the eect of a
violation of the NCC embargo period on the rm's value and the manager's
wealth, which turns it also useful for courts to set the fair reimbursement
amount that is due to the rm in case of litigation. Thirdly, we extend our
model to the valuation of a GL and provide a comparative analysis which en-
ables the characterization of the market conditions in which the NCC might
be preferred to the GL, and vice versa. We show that both the rm and the
manager behavior is largely inuenced by the optionality nature of the NCC.
This work provides a formal theoretical guide for the negotiation of NCC
and GL in employment contracts. It may have therefore a positive eect
on the popularity of these contracts in the future, by preventing litigation
or reducing litigation uncertainty, namely that which is related to the fair
reimbursement amount that is due to the rm when there is a violation of
the NCC. It can also help policy makers in the development of more ecient
labor laws and regulations involving NCC and GL.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model
for the valuation of the NCC and provides a sensitivity analysis. Section 3
studies the scenario where the manager violates the NCC and shows our
analytical solution for the reimbursement amount that is due to the rm.
Section 4 presents our model for the valuation of the GL and provides a
sensitivity analysis. Section 5 studies the wealth eects. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. The Model
Consider a market with two active rms, i and j, with prots xKi and
xKj, respectively, which depend on a stochastic factor (x) and the rm's
capital stock, Ki and Kj. Assume that x evolves over time according to a
geometric Brownian motion (GBM):
dx = xdt+ xdz (1)
where , , and dz are, respectively, the drift under the risk-neutral mea-
sure, the volatility, and the increment of a Wiener process. Without loss of
generality we normalize the capital stocks and assume that the two rms are
symmetric (Ki = Kj = 1).
6
Assume also that a manager is currently working for rm i, earning a
salary that is a percentage (wi) of x. Furthermore, suppose that rm i is
afraid that the manager may leave the employment in the future to work for
a competitor (rm j). This is a problem for rm i because the manager holds
valuable business information which, if it is shared with rm j, will lead to
an immediate prot loss to rm i (a gain to rm j). Let us assume that this
loss (gain) is given by a factor  2 (0; 1) which represents a percentage of x.9
To prevent the above prot loss, rm i negotiates with the manager a
NCC that forbids her from working for rm j over a given embargo period
(T ) after she leaves the employment. The NCC has value for rm i because
it protects valuable business information from a competitor over the embargo
period, but destroys value for the manager because it deters her from working
in the industry (rm j) immediately after leaving rm i, which reduces the
value of her \option to leave" rm i. Thus, the manager should only accept
the NCC if she receives a severance payment which (at least) osets the
devaluation of the option to leave rm i.
Suppose now that both the rm i and the manager agree with a NCC and
the latter leaves the employment at a given time (tL). Because the manager
cannot work immediately for rm j, the prot loss (x) for rm i caused
by the termination of the employment is deferred to the end of the embargo
period. Finally, assume that the manager's salary outside the industry is
given by wo and is independent of x.
The maturity of the NCC is nite, therefore, over the embargo period,
the manager holds a forward-start option (FSO) that gives her the right to
reenter the industry after the embargo period. Let us dene tC = tL + T ,
where tC is the time at which the NCC expires and tL is the time at which
the manager leaves rm i, and tR as the time at which the manager reenters
the industry. If at tC it is optimal for the manager to reenter the industry,
then tC=tR, otherwise tC < tR. Finally, assume that the manager reenters
the industry at tR with a salary wj(1 + )x, where wj is a percentage of x.
This timing optimization problem comprises three stages, which we illus-
trate in Figure 1. Note that both the optimal time to exercise the option to
leave rm i and the value of the FSO depend on the future evolution of x,
which is not known ex ante. To solve this optimization problem we follow a
9Without loss of generality, we assume that rm i's prot loss corresponds to rm j's
prots gain.
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tL tC=tL+T	 tR 
Stage 1 
wix+ option to leave  wo+ FSO  wjx 
(manager works for firm i) (embargo period of the covenant) (manager works for firm j) 
Stage 2 Stage 3 
Figure 1: Time line. At tL the manager leaves rm i and starts working outside the
industry, during the embargo period of the NCC. At tC the embargo period ends. At tR
the manager reenters the industry, working for rm j. Up to tL is the Stage 1, where
the manager works for rm i. Between tL and tR is the Stage 2, where the manager
works outside the industry. After tR is the Stage 3, where the manager works for rm
j. For simplicity of the illustration we set tR > tC , but tR = tC is also possible if, at
tC , it is optimal for the manager to reenter the industry. For simplicity, in our analytical
derivations we set tL = 0, thus tC = T .
standard backwards-induction procedure. Specically, we start by the tim-
ing optimization of the last stage and work then backwards until the timing
optimization of the rst stage.
Thus, while in Stage 2, the manager holds the option to reenter the
industry (R(x)) which, according to a contingent-claim analysis, must satisfy
the following ordinary dierential equation:
1
2
2x2Rxx(x) + xRx(x)  rR(x) = 0 (2)
whose general solution is:
R(x) = A1x
1 + A2x
2 (3)
where A1 and A2 are arbitrary constants to be determined and 1 and 2 are,
respectively, the positive and the negative roots of the following characteristic
quadratic equation: 0:52(   1) +    r = 0, given by:
1 =
1
2
  
2
+
s

2
  1
2
2
+
2r
2
> 1 (4)
2 =
1
2
  
2
 
s

2
  1
2
2
+
2r
2
< 0 (5)
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The option is worthless for x = 0, therefore we must set A2 = 0. The
optimal time for the manager to reenter the industry (tR) is dened as:
tR = infft > tC : x(t) > xRg (6)
where xR is the optimal threshold to reenter the industry. For simplicity of
notation, hereafter, we set tL = 0, thus tC = T .
The constant A1 and the trigger xR are determined using the so-called
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, given by Equations (7) and
(8), respectively:
A1x
1
R = wj (1 + )
xR
r     
wo
r
(7)
1A1x
1 1
R = wj (1 + )
1
r    (8)
The economic interpretation for Equation (7) is as follows: the term in the
left-hand side represents the value of the option to reenter the industry. This
option is exercised at the rst moment its value equals that of the terms
in the right-hand side, where the rst represents the manager's gain from
reentering the industry, which comprises a percentage wj of both the market
prot and the rm j's prot gain associated with the manager's reentry in the
industry, and the second represents the manager's salary outside the industry
(an opportunity cost if the manager reenters the industry).
Using Equations (7) and (8) we obtain both the value of the option and
the threshold to reenter the industry, respectively:
R(x) =
8><>:

wj (1 + )
xR
r     
wo
r

x
xR
1
for x < xR
wj (1 + )
x
r     
wo
r
for x > xR
(9)
xR =
1
1   1
r   
wj(1 + )
wo
r
(10)
We turn now our attention to the beginning of Stage 2 where, due to
the embargo period, the manager holds a FSO to reenter the industry whose
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value is given by:10
F (x; T ) = wj (1 + )
x
r   e
 (r )TN (d1(x; T ))  wo
r
e rTN (d2(x; T ))
+

wj (1 + )
xR
r     
wo
r

x
xR
1
N ( d3(x; T )) (11)
where N(:) is the cumulative normal integral, and
d1(x; T ) =
ln

x
xR

+

 +
1
2
2

T

p
T
(12)
d2(x; T ) = d1(x; T )  
p
T (13)
d3(x; T ) = d1(x; T ) + (1   1)
p
T (14)
In the right-hand side of Equation (11), the rst two terms represents
the value of the FSO if xR is reached before or at T (this is equivalent to
the value of an European option on a dividend paying stock with maturity T
that is exercised at T if x(T ) > xR), and the last term represents the value of
the FSO if, at T , xR has not yet been reached (this is equivalent to the value
of an American option which exists if, at T , xR has not yet been reached).
Now let us focus on the optimization problem at Stage 1, where the
manager works for rm i with a salary wix and holds the option to leave the
employment, L(x; T ). The value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
for this case are:
B2x
2
L = F (xL; T ) + C +
wo
r
  wi xL
r    (15)
2B2x
2 1
L = Fx(xL; T )  wi
1
r    (16)
where xL is the manager's optimal threshold to leave rm i and C is the
severance payment associated with the NCC.
The economic interpretation for Equation (15) is as follows: the term in
the left-hand side represents the value of the option to leave rm i. Note that
the payo of the option to leave rm i resembles that of a put option.11 This
10The analytical derivation of the FSO value is provided in the Appendix A.
11Note that L(x; T ) is the solution for an ordinary dierential equation similar to that
represented by Equation (2), with the following general solution: L(x; T ) = B1x
1+B2x
2 .
Hence, using standard arguments from the real options framework, for a put option we
conclude that B1 = 0.
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option should be exercised at the rst moment its value equals that which is
represented by the terms in the right-hand side, where the rst is the value
of the FSO, the second is a severance payment, the third is the manager's
salary while working outside the industry, and the fourth is an opportunity
cost for leaving rm i.
The manager holds the option to leave which is exercised at the threshold
xL, considering the terms of the NCC (C and T ). Following standard real
options procedures we obtain the expression below for the value of the option
to leave rm i:
L(x; T ) =
8><>:
C +
wo
r
+ F (x; T )  wi x
r    for x < xL
C +
wo
r
+ F (xL; T )  wi xL
r   

x
xL
2
for x > xL
(17)
and the optimal threshold (xL) for the manager to leave rm i, which is
determined numerically using:
2

C +
wo
r
+ F (xL; T )  wi xL
r   

  Fx(xL; T )xL + wi xL
r    = 0 (18)
2.1. Results
In this section we present our results and a sensitivity analysis. Specif-
ically, Figure 2 shows the eect of C on xL for a given set of T values,
and reveals that xL increases with C and decreases with T . Thus, a higher
severance payment motivates the manager to leave the employment earlier,
whereas a longer embargo period persuades the manager to leave the employ-
ment later. Our results also show that the sensitivity of xL to T increases
with C. These ndings partially corroborate Schwab and Thomas (2006) re-
sults, showing that for later departures the relationship between the embargo
period and the severance payment is weaker.
Figure 3 shows the eect on xL of our model parameters, for a given set of
C and T values. Although with slightly dierent sensitivities, we nd that xL
decreases with T and increases with C for all the model parameters. Thus,
a longer embargo period delays and a higher severance payment accelerates
the termination of the employment. As suggested by Marx (2011), managers
tied with NCC are more likely to take career detours.
Additionally, Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show that xL decreases signicantly
with , therefore, the manager leaves the employment later as the uncertainty
11
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 = 0:3, r = 0:05,  = 0:01, wo = 0:025, wi = 0:05, wj = 0:05,  = 0:1.
Figure 2: A sensitivity analysis for the eect of the severance payment (C) and the embargo
period of a non-compete covenant (NCC) on the optimal threshold to leave rm i (xL).
increases. We also conclude that the sensitivity of xL to changes in T and
C decreases with the industry uncertainty. Figures 3(c) and 3(d) show that
xL increases with wo, Figures 3(e) and 3(f) show that xL decreases with wi,
and Figures 3(g) and 3(h) reveal that xL increases with wj. Consequently,
the manager leaves the employment earlier if her salary outside the industry
(wo) or her salary after reentering the industry (wj) increase, and leaves her
employment later if her salary while working for rm i (wi) increases. Notice
that, the positive relation between wo and xL is because a higher wo means
a lower opportunity cost for the manager if she leaves rm i, the negative
relation between xL and wi is because a higher wi means a higher opportunity
cost for the manager if she leaves rm i, and the positive relation between
wj and xL is because a higher wj means that the manager will earn a higher
salary if she leaves rm i and reenters the industry after the termination of
the embargo period. Finally, from Figures 3(i) and 3(j) we conclude that
xL increases with , which means that the manager leaves the employment
sooner if she is able to carry more value to the competitor.
Suppose now that the manager wants to leave rm i today, being x the
current prot value. It is possible to determine a myriad of embargo peri-
ods (T ) vs. severance payment (C) pair values which make optimal for the
manager to leave rm i now (x = xL).
12 Figure 4 shows iso-threshold lines
12Some exogenous restrictions may exist for the duration of the covenant. In fact,
dierent countries or jurisdictions may dene time-limits for the embargo period. However,
we do not not discuss the "legal" maximum duration of the covenants. On the contrary, we
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Figure 3: A sensitivity analysis for the eect of our model parameters on the optimal
threshold to leave rm i (xL), for a non-compete covenant (NCC).
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for dierent model parameters and T vs. C pair values. Points on the iso-
threshold lines represent dierent scenarios of T vs. C pair values for which
it is optimal for the manager to leave rm i. Our ndings show that C in-
creases with T in all the sensitivity analyses. This is because the manager's
opportunity cost, if she leaves rm i, increases with T .
More specically, Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show that C increases with both
x and . The positive relation between x and C is because a higher x means
a higher opportunity cost for the manager, if she leaves rm i. The positive
relation between  and C means that the manager claims a higher severance
payment if the uncertainty increases, which suggests that the severance pay-
ment is signicantly aected by the risk level of the industry. Figure 4(c)
shows that C decreases slightly with wo for long embargo periods, whereas
the opposite occurs for short periods. Finally, Figure 4(d) shows that C in-
creases with wi, and Figures 4(e) and 4(f) reveal that C decreases with both
wj and , being these results in line with what is expected. In fact, a higher
salary paid by j and a higher value carried by the manager both promote her
departure. Therefore, rm i can pay less C for the same departure timing.
3. Early Reentry and Litigation
In this section we study the scenario where the manager violates the
covenant (reentering the industry before T ). When the manager obeys the
covenant, she reenters the industry at tR, according to Equation (6). How-
ever, the market conditions can improve signicantly while the manager is
working outside the industry so as xR is reached before T and she may con-
sider to reenter the industry before T . Obviously, the manager is aware that
if she does so the case can end up in court and she might be force to reim-
burse the rm for the value loss. Cases of litigation involving NCC are very
frequent, particularly in the US. Below we analyze the above scenario from
the point of view of the rm and the manager.
3.1. The Firm
Let us assume that the manager is in the embargo period. At any time
t < T , rm i holds a short position in the manager's FSO, whose value is
keep it open for discussion between the parties, and our model return the corresponding
optimal severance payment for any given embargo period and rm prot level.
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Figure 4: A sensitivity analysis for the eect of our model parameters on the optimal
severance payment (C) versus embargo period (T ) pair values, for a non-compete covenant
(NCC).
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given by:
HRi (x; t; T ) =  (1  wi)e (r )(T t)
x
r   N (d1(x; T   t))
  (1  wi) xR
r   

x
xR
1
N ( d3(x; T   t)) (19)
In the right-hand side of Equation (19), the rst term represents the value
loss for rm i if xR is reached before or at T , and the second term captures
the value loss if xR has not yet been reached when T arrives (note that the
manager only exercises the FSO at T if xR has been reached). Notice that
when the manager reenters the industry working for rm j, the value loss of
rm i is partially absorbed by its new manager ((1  wi)).
Let us assume that the manager reenters the industry before T , for x >
xR, violating the covenant. This action leads to the following loss in value
for rm i:
HNRi (x) =  (1  wi)
x
r    (20)
If at the early reentry time x > xR, one can easily show that HNRi (x) >
HRi (x; t; T ) and the rm i's value loss is given by:
Wi(x; t; T ) = H
NR
i (x) HRi (x; t; T ) < 0; 8x > xR (21)
3.2. The Manager
We now analyze the scenario described above but from the manager's
perspective. Once again, let us assume that the manager does not obey the
covenant and reenters the industry before T . While working outside the
industry, she holds a long position in the FSO whose value is given by:13
HRm(x; t; T ) = F (x; T   t)
= wj (1 + )
x
r   e
 (r )(T t)N (d1(x; T   t))
 wo
r
e r(T t)N (d2(x; T   t))
+

wj (1 + )
xR
r     
wo
r

x
xR
1
N ( d3(x; T   t))(22)
13See Equation (11).
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If the manager reenters the industry during the embargo period, her
wealth is:
HNRm (x) = wj(1 + )
x
r     
wo
r
(23)
and so the manager's net wealth gain is given by:
Wm(x; t; T ) = H
NR
m (x) HRm(x; t; T ) > 0; 8x > xR (24)
3.3. Litigation
Let us assume that the rm opts for litigation because the manager reen-
ters the industry before T . As mentioned earlier, a typical litigation case
involving a NCC is well illustrated by that which involved Microsoft, Google
and Kai-Fu Lee. Our model provides some guidance for courts' decisions.
One view could be that the reimbursement due to the rm should correspond
to the illegal gains of the manager. Another view could be that the reimburse-
ment should compensate the rm for the value loss caused by the manger's
action. Therefore, the court's decision on the reimbursement amount (Z)
should be bounded according to Zm =Wm(x; t; T ) 6 Z 6 Zi = jWi(x; t; T )j.
If courts' practice is to set Z = Zm, the manager would be indierent between
obeying and violation the non-compete covenant, because the net eect of
such behavior is nil. Hence, this practice would not prevent the violation of
NCC. On the other hand, any reimbursement higher than Zm leads to a net
loss for the manager, and the likelihood of this outcome should be pondered
by the manager while deciding whether to violate the NCC or not. Naturally,
the likelihood of a reimbursement lower than Zm encourages the manager to
violate the covenant.14
3.4. Results
In this section we present our results and a sensitivity analysis. Figure
5 shows the eect of our model parameters on Zi and Zm, for a given set
of t values, where t represents the time at which the manager reenters the
14A more thorough analysis could also consider the direct litigation costs (i.e., court,
lawyers/legal advisers fees) as well as the indirect costs such as those related to the loss
of the managers' focus on the core business due to the litigation case, and the rm's
conjecture about the probability of winning the case in court, but our main ndings would
still hold.
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industry. We nd that for all the sensitivity analysis, Zi and Zm decrease
with t, which is in line with what we would expect since the closer to the
end of the embargo period is the reentry of the manager in the industry, the
lower the value loss to the rm and the value gain for the manager.15
More specically, Figure 5(a) and 5(b) show that the earlier (within the
embargo period) the violation of the covenant, the higher is the value loss
for rm i and the value gain for the manager. Figures 5(c) and 5(d) show
the eect of  on Zi and Zm, respectively, for dierent values of t, and reveal
that Zi increases and Zm decreases with . In addition, for low or relatively
moderate values of , the sensitivity of Zi and Zm to changes in  is very
low, but as  increases, a region is reached beyond which Zi and Zm both
become very sensitive to . This means that rms from high risk industries
face a much higher value loss if there is a violation of the covenant, thus
they are entitled to a signicantly higher reimbursement, whereas managers
working in high risk industries have a much smaller value gain if they vio-
late the covenant. This is a very important nding because it shows that
the reimbursement amount is signicantly aected by the risk level of the
industry.16
Figure 5(e) and 5(f) show the eect of wo on Zi and Zm, respectively,
for dierent values of t, and reveal that Zi increases and Zm decreases with
wo. Thus, the higher the manager's salary outside the industry, the higher
is the reimbursement if there is a violation of the covenant. Figure 5(g) and
5(h) show the eect of wj on Zi and Zm, respectively, for dierent values of
t, and reveal that Zi decreases and Zm increases with wj. The intuition for
the negative relation between Zi and wj is that as wj increases the likelihood
that the manager reenters the industry at the end of the embargo period
increases which, on one hand, enhances the value loss for the rm but, on the
other hand, makes the loss caused by the violation of the covenant relatively
smaller. The positive relation between wj and Zm is in line with what we
would expect because the higher the manager's salary at rm j the more
15Notice that in our sensitivity analysis we set T = 4 as a base parameter, thus, in
Figure 5, t = 0:5, t = 1 and t = 1:5 represent points in time where we are 3.5, 3 and 2.5
years from the end of the embargo period, respectively.
16Note that the manager reenters the industry at t < T only if x(t) > xR, but the higher
the market prot uncertainty the more likely is that her decision to violate the covenant is
non-optimal in the near future (for instance at T ) which reduces the manager's gain from
the violation of the covenant.
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advantageous is for the manager the violation of the covenant. Figure 5(i)
and 5(j) show the eect of  on Zi and Zm, respectively, for dierent values
of t, and reveal that Zi and Zm both increase with , which is according to
what we would expect.
4. Garden Leave
The use of Garden Leaves (GL) in employment agreements is also popular.
The GL has a similar restriction regarding working for a competitor as the
NCC, and may even prevent a manager from working at all, but during the
embargo period, the manager is paid a given compensation package by the
ex-employer.
We may argue that GL agreements can be more eective in those coun-
tries or jurisdictions where labor legislation has a clear distinction between
employment-term and post-term restrictions (such as in Austria, Bulgaria,
Argentina, or California, among others), accepting those restrictions only
during the employment-term. Under this context, GL may allow to over-
come the post-employment restrictive covenant enforceability in these coun-
tries, converting the post-term restriction into an employment-period one.
However, even in jurisdictions where the distinction between employment-
term and post-term restrictions does not apply, courts and policymakers tend
to see more favorably GL than NCC. Also rms may prefer GL agreements
since courts are more likely to enforce them than the covenants not to com-
pete (Perri, 2010). In this section, we extend our model above to the GL
agreements.
Let us assume that a manager works for rm i and agrees with a GL
which forbids her from working for a competitor (rm j) during an embargo
period (T ), if she leaves the employment. Following similar arguments as for
the NCC, the value of the option and the optimal threshold for the manager
to leave rm i (xG) are determined using the following value-matching and
smooth-pasting:
D2x
2
G =
g0
r
 
1  e rT + g1 xG
r   
 
1  e (r )T + F (xG; T )
+
wo
r
e rT   wi xG
r    (25)
2D2x
2 1
G =g1
1
r   
 
1  e (r )T + Fx(xG; T )  wi 1
r    (26)
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Figure 5: A sensitivity analysis for the eect of our model parameters on the value loss
of the rm i (Zi) and the value gain of the manager (Zm), when the manager is tied
to a non-compete covenant (NCC) and there is a violation of the embargo period of the
contract.
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The left-hand side of Equation (25) represents the value of the option
to leave rm i (a put option). This option is exercised as soon as its value
equals that represented by the terms in the right-hand side, where, the rst
term represents the manager's salaries outside the industry over the embargo
period (paid by rm i), the second term is the value of the FSO, the third
term is the value of the manager's salary outside the industry, which exists
only if at T it is not yet optimal for the manager to reenter the industry,17
and the fourth is the opportunity cost for the manager if she leaves the
employment. We assume that the manager's salary during the garden leave
has a xed and a variable component, being her salary at any given point in
time given by g0+g1x (with g1 < wi). This is reasonable assumption because
over the GL period the manager's salary tends to be less dependent on the
rm performance.
The value of the option to leave rm i is given by:
LG(x; T ) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
go
r
(1  e rT ) + g1 x
r   (1  e
 (r )T ) + F (x; T )
+
wo
r
e rT   wi x
r    for x < xG
go
r
(1  e rT ) + g1 xG
r   (1  e
 (r )T ) + F (xG; T )
+
wo
r
e rT   wi xG
r   

x
xG
2
for x > xG
(27)
being the manager's threshold to leave rm i (xG) determined numerically
using Equation (28):
2

go
r
(1  e rT ) + g1 xG
r   
 
1  e (r )T + F (xG; T ) + wo
r
e rT   wi xG
r   

 g1 xG
r   
 
1  e (r )T   Fx(xG; T )xG + wi xG
r    = 0(28)
4.1. Results
In this section we present our results for the GL and provide a comparative
analysis between the GL and the NCC. Specically, Figure 6 shows the eect
17Note that the salary outside the industry (wo) exists from T until the optimal to
reentry time if, at T , it is not yet optimal for the manager to reenter the industry. This
aspect is taken into account in our modeling setting by considering
wo
r
e rT also in the
expression that represents the value of FSO, so as these two terms cancel out.
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of our model parameters on xG, for dierent values of T , and Figure 7 shows
a comparative analysis between the NCC and the GL, regarding the eect of
our model parameters on the manager's thresholds to leave (xG) rm i. Our
results show that xG decreases with T for g0, g1 and wo, for low uncertainty
and wi, and for high wj and . Thus, the manager leaves her employment
later as T increases in these cases.
In addition, Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show that xG decreases with  and in-
creases with g0, respectively. However, whilst the sensitivity of xG to changes
in g0 is more or less constant over g0, the sensitivity of xG to changes in 
is higher for lower values of . Figures 6(c) and 6(d) reveal that xG in-
creases with both g1 and wo. From Figures 6(e) and 6(f) we conclude that
xG decreases with wi and increases with wj, and Figure 6(g) shows that xG
increases with . These results are in line with what we would expect.
Figure 7(a) shows that xL and xG both decrease with . Yet, for low
or relatively moderate values of , the manager leaves the employment later
if tied to a NCC. This nding is important because it suggests that if the
intention of the NCC or the GL is to deter a manager from leaving the
employment, the risk level of the industry plays an important role in the
selection of the optimal contract.
Figure 7(b) shows that for both contracts the manager leaves later the
employment as T increases. We note however that, for long embargo peri-
ods the manager leaves the employment later when tied with NCC and the
opposite holds for short embargo periods.
These results are of some signicance and may justify both the popularity
of the NCC, as compared to the GL, and why the GL contract is usually seen
more favorably by courts. As noted in the introduction section, courts tend
to see long embargo periods as being economic and socially unacceptable.
It would be interesting to collect data on the length of the embargo periods
of the NCC and the GL in order to examine whether there are signicant
dierences between these two contracts. Our theoretical ndings suggest that
there might be.
Figures 7(c) show that both xL and xG increase with wo, being the GL
more eective in preventing the leaving of the manager, except for low values
of wo. Figure 7(d) reveals that both xL and xG decrease with wi. Never-
theless, for relatively low values of wi, the NCC is more eective than the
GL in preventing the leaving of the manager but, as wi increases, a point is
reached beyond which the GL is more eective in preventing the leaving of
the manager. This nding is also of some relevance because it shows that
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Figure 6: A sensitivity analysis for the eect of our model parameters on the optimal
threshold to leave rm i (xG) if the manager is tied to a garden leave (GL).
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the manager's salary before the termination of the employment may play a
role in the selection of the contract. Indeed, our results show that the GL is
a more eective contract when the manger's salary is relatively high.
Finally, Figure 7(e) and 7(f) show that both xL and xG increase with wj
and , and the NCC is more eective than the GL for high salaries in rm j
and for a high value transfer.
5. Wealth eects
In the model setting of the previous sections, the use of a NCC or a GL
in an employment contract has no impact on the overall industry prots, i.e.
these depend only on the uctuations over time of the exogenous variable
(x). Nevertheless, the terms of the NCC and the GL contracts can have a
signicant and asymmetric wealth eect on the industry players, i.e. the two
rms (i and j) and the manager. Thus, we provide in this section a wealth
eect analysis.
The manager of rm i, under a NCC or a GL, loses the increment in
salary from moving immediately to rm j and gains the option to leave -
L(x; T ) for a NCC (Equation (17)), or LG(x; T ) for a GL (Equation (27)).
The wealth eect for the NCC and the GL are, respectively, given by:
(x; T ) = L(x; T )  (wj(1 + )  wi) x
r    (29)
Gm(x; T ) = L
G(x; T )  (wj(1 + )  wi) x
r    (30)
When using a NCC, the wealth eect for rm i is the following:
i(x; T ) =(1  wi) x
r     

(1  wi)e (r )T xL
r   N (d1(xL; T ))
+(1  wi) xR
r   

xL
xR
1
N ( d3(xL; T )) + C
#
x
xL
2
; for x > xL
(31)
With the NCC, the rm (i) prevents the impact of losing the manager
immediately to rm j; (ii) holds a short position on the manager FSO to
reenter the industry (obtained from Equation (19) with t = 0); and (iii) also
holds a short position on the option of the manager to leave the rm, upon
which the severance payment is due. Hence, the NCC delays a value loss
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Figure 7: A comparative sensitivity analysis between a non-compete covenant (NCC)
and a garden leave (GL), regarding the eect of our model parameters on the optimal
thresholds to leave rm i.
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related to an immediate move of the manager to rm j, but this value loss
protection is made at a cost: the severance payment (C). We note that the
last two terms of the above equation are discounted to the current level of x.
Similarly, the wealth eect form rm i when using a GL is the following:
Gi (x; T ) =(1  wi)
x
r     

(1  wi)e (r )T xG
r   N (d1(xG; T ))
+(1  wi) xR
r   

xG
xR
1
N ( d3(xG; T ))
+wi
xG
r   
 
1  e (r )T  x
xG
2
; for x > xG (32)
Notice that the dierence between the GL and the NCC regarding the
wealth eect lies only in the nal term, where the severance payment associ-
ated with the NCC is replaced by the manager's salary over the GL period.
Contrary to what happens to rm i, rm j has a positive payo when the
manager exercises the option to reenter the industry:
j(x; T ) =  (1  wj) x
r    +

(1  wj)e (r )T xL
r   N (d1(xL; T ))
+(1  wj) xR
r   

xL
xR
1
N ( d3(xL; T ))
#
x
xL
2
; for x > xL
(33)
Gj (x; T ) =  (1  wj)
x
r    +

(1  wj)e (r )T xG
r   N (d1(xG; T ))
+(1  wj) xR
r   

xG
xR
1
N ( d3(xG; T ))
#
x
xG
2
; for x > xG
(34)
The NCC or the GL delays a value gain for rm j and the wealth eects
of these two contracts are the same if xL = xG. Notice that, the dierence
between the current industry prot level (x) and the manager's thresholds
to leave (xL and xG) is a key factor for the analysis of the wealth eects.
Specically, when these get closer, it favors the wealth of rm j and the
wealth of the manager, and damages the wealth of rm i. We analyze the
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wealth eects of three agents: the manager and rms i and j. The remaining
wealth eect is borne by the managers of the other rms operating in the
market. Below, we provide a wealth eect sensitivity analysis for the eect
of T ,  and .
From our results (refer to Figures 8, 9 and 10), the big picture that
is worth mentioning is that the non-compete agreements (NCC and GL)
produce negative wealth eects, both for the employee and the competing
rm (rm j).18 Moreover, the aggregate wealth impact reveals to be negative.
Our results seem to support the broad negative view that courts and
policymakers have on NCC and GL (Callahan, 1985; Den Hertog, 2003).
However, contrary to what seems to be a higher tolerance about GL, when
compared to NCC, revealed by courts and policymakers (Klein and Pap-
pas, 2009) our results seem to show that, in aggregate terms, NCC are less
harmful than GL. However, if the courts decisions concern mainly employees'
position, we see that, depending on the embargo period and uncertainty, one
instrument can be less negative than the other.
An interesting question refers to the motivation for an employee to accept
an agreement that reveals to be painful for her. The justication may rely
on some of the motives reported by Starr et al. (2017), not incorporated in
our setting, namely that a negotiation was not possible, there was a fear of
being red, to avoid tension, the belief that the employer would not sue or
the court would not enforce.
6. Conclusion
We develop a dynamic model which assesses non-compete covenants (NCC)
and garden leaves (GL) in employment agreements. We examine the eect of
these contracts on the manager's behavior regarding the termination of the
employment and the violation of the NCC, and the behavior of both the rm
and the manager concerning the negotiation of these agreements. It is the
rst theoretical model that evaluates the rm-manager competing interests
comparing NCC to GL under uncertainty.
Our ndings can have signicant future implications in the negotiation
of NCC and GL, as well as on the evaluation of the enforceability of these
18The only exception is for low values of . In our analysis we ignore this case because,
naturally, if the manager carries low value when moving to j, rm i will be less interested
in promoting a non-competing agreement.
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Figure 8: A sensitivity analysis of the eect of the embargo period (T ) on the wealth.
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Figure 9: A sensitivity analysis of the eect of uncertainty () on the wealth.
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Figure 10: A sensitivity analysis for the eect of the value loss/gain to rm i=j () caused
by the departure of the manager from rm i to rm j on the wealth.
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contracts. For the NCC, we conclude that the embargo period and the sev-
erance payment largely determine the manager's behavior regarding the ter-
mination of the employment and the timing of the manager for the (illegal)
early reentry in the industry. We also nd that the reimbursement amount is
signicantly aected by the industry uncertainty. For low or relatively mod-
erate levels of uncertainty, it is only slightly sensitive to uncertainty changes,
but as it increases beyond a certain level, the reimbursement increases sig-
nicantly with uncertainty. Thus, rms operating in industries with higher
risk are entitled to higher reimbursements.
Comparing NCC with GL, we conclude that, for low or relatively moder-
ate market uncertainty, the manager leaves the employment later if tied to
a NCC. This is a very important result because it provides some guidance
on the selection of the optimal contract considering the market conditions
and the existing laws and regulations which inhibit the use of long embargo
periods. The manager also leaves later the rm if tied to a NCC when the
embargo period is long, or her salary now or when working outside the in-
dustry is low, or her salary when working for the competitor or the damage
that is associated with the departure of the manager to the competitor is
high.
We also compare the NCC with GL using their wealth eects, showing
how the competing interests of the manager and the rm are inuenced by the
model parameters. Our results seem to support the broad negative view that
courts and policymakers have on NCC and GL. However, contrary to what
seems to be a higher tolerance about GL, when compared to NCC, revealed
by courts and policymaker, our results suggest that, in aggregate terms, NCC
are less harmful than GL. However, if courts are mostly concerned with the
manager's position, the instrument which is less harmful depends on the
embargo period and uncertainty.
It would be a very valuable research to test empirically some of our main
ndings, if there is data available. For instance, by examining the relationship
between the industry uncertainty and the popularity of the NCC and GL,
or studying whether there is a signicant dierence between the embargo
periods of the NCC and GL, or investigating whether the embargo periods
of the NCC and GL are determined by the industry uncertainty. From a
theoretical point of view, it would be interesting to go one step back in
our modeling setting and studying this decision problem at the hiring and
negotiation stages.
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Appendix A. Proof of Equation 11
For the analytical derivation of the forward start option (FSO) value, we
need the discounted risk-neutral expected value, which is given by:
F (x; T ) = e rTE [R(x(T ))] (A.1)
where R(x(T )) is the value of the option to reenter at time T . Note that
from Equation (9) R(x(T )) has two regions, therefore:
F (x; T ) = e rTE

wj (1 + )
x
r     
wo
r

1x(T )>xR

+e rTE

gx(T )11x(T )<xR

(A.2)
where g =

wj (1 + )
xR
r     
wo
r

1
xR
1
, and 1condition equals 1 if the
condition is met, and 0 otherwise.
Following Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007), the rst component in
F (x; T ) is the dierence between an asset-or-nothing call option on wj (1 + )
x(T )
r    ,
and a cash-or-nothing call option on
wo
r
, with exercise price xR, and maturity
T :
e rTE

R(x(T ))1x(T )>xR

= wj (1 + )
x
r   e
 (r )TN (d1(x; T ))
 wo
r
e rTN (d2(x; T )) (A.3)
where
d1(x; T ) =
ln

x
xR

+

 +
1
2
2

T

p
T
(A.4)
d2(x; T ) = d1(x; T )  
p
T (A.5)
From the Appendix A of Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007) we acknowl-
edge that the second component of F (x; T ) is:
e rTE

R(x(T ))1x(T )<xR

= gx1N ( d3(x; T ))
=

wj (1 + )
xR
r     
wo
r

x
xR
1
N ( d3(x; T )) (A.6)
32
where
d3(x; T ) =
ln

x
xR

+

 +

1   1
2

2

T

p
T
(A.7)
d3(x; T ) = d1(x; T ) + (1   1)
p
T (A.8)
Shackleton and Wojakowski (2007) show that the risk-neutral expectation
of a claim x(T ), for a general , conditional on the initial value x is:
e rTE

x(T )1x(T )>xR

= eq()TxN (h()) (A.9)
e rTE

x(T )1x(T )<xR

= eq()TxN ( h()) (A.10)
where
h() =
ln

x
xR

+

+

   1
2

2

T

p
T
(A.11)
q() =
1
2
2(   1) +    r (A.12)
In our notation, d1(x; T ) = h(1), d2(x; T ) = h(0), and d3(x; T ) = h(1).
Noting that q(1) =  (r   ), q(0) =  r, q(1) = 0, Equations (A.3) and
(A.6) are obtained.
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